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NOTE
STATUTORY INTERDEPENDENCE IN
SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS
Rachel J. Ezzell*
According to conventional wisdom, when a court rules a statutory provi-
sion unconstitutional, it must sever that provision or strike down the entire
statute. This understanding is incomplete. In practice, courts may engage
in compound severance: invalidating additional, otherwise constitutional
provisions of the statute without striking down the entire statute. They rea-
son that the degree of interrelation between those provisions is so
significant that severance of one compels severance of the other As a re-
sult, a subset of the statute remains law. The power to craft such subsets
raises constitutional concerns, and yet the jurisprudence concerning statu-
tory interdependence is inconsistent and unclear
Courts analyze provisions for interdependence in three distinct ways: by
divining congressional purpose, speculating the terms of the legislative
bargain, and searching for textual evidence of congressional intent. Great-
er predictability in this area would alleviate constitutional concerns and
better ensure democratic accountability. This Note argues for adoption of
a "qualified clear statement rule" in which courts only find related provi-
sions interdependent either when Congress has provided a clear statement
to that effect or when allowing a related provision to have effect would re-
sult in an objectively irrational law. It then applies this rule to resolve a
circuit split concerning severability of the Food and Drug Modernization
Act. The qualified clear statement rule not only is consistent with the
Court's severability test but also would provide better guidance to courts
evaluating provisions for statutory interdependence as well as limit in-
stances of judicial overreach.
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INTRODUCTION
When a court rules a statutory provision in a complex piece of legisla-
tion unconstitutional, it must decide whether to retain or invalidate the
remaining provisions of the statute. Severability doctrine governs this
determination.' While severability of statutes is often discussed as an all-or-
nothing proposition, with commentators focusing on whether statutory
remainders should be saved or struck in their entirety,' there are, in fact,
three possible outcomes. First, a court can sever only the unconstitutional
provision, which I call "simple severance." Second, it can sever the uncon-
stitutional provision along with some constitutional provisions but without
striking down the entire statute, which I call "compound severance." In each
of these two outcomes, a court allows some statutory remainder to have le-
gal effect. Finally, it can strike down the entire statute, which I call "total
invalidation."3 The Supreme Court's test presumes that provisions are sever-
able, meaning that normally a court should simply excise the
unconstitutional provision and leave the rest of the statute intact.4 This pre-
sumption of simple severability can be rebutted by a finding of statutory
interdependence-that is, a finding that the relationship between two or
1. See infra Part I. For comprehensive overviews on the severability of statutes, see
John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993), and Robert L. Stem, Separa-
bility and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76 (1937).
2. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L.
REV. 41, 73 (1995) ("Where the statute remained silent on the question [of severability], the
court would ... sever the unconstitutional provision and enforce the remainder of the stat-
ute.").
3. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 772 (2d Cir. 1999), aff'd,
531 U.S. 533 (2001) ("The next question is which part of the statute should be found invalid
as a result of the unconstitutionality of the viewpoint-based proviso to the suit-for-benefits
exception. The four most likely candidates for invalidation are (1) the entire Act; (2) the entire
subsection (a)(l 6) relating to welfare reform; (3) the entire suit-for-benefits exception; and (4)
the proviso to the effect that an attorney suing for a client's benefits may not challenge exist-
ing law.").
4. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam)).
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more statutory provisions is so significant that severance of one provision
compels severance of the other.'
The Court has indicated that statutory interdependence exists in two cir-
cumstances. The first is when Congress intended certain provisions to be
inseverable from each other.6 The second is when certain provisions are le-
gaily inoperable without the unconstitutional provision.7 Assuming that
Congress would not have intended to enact a legally inoperable statute, the
two circumstances necessarily overlap. 8 Partly for this reason, the Court has
stated that congressional intent is the primary focus of severability and
statutory-interdependence analysis. 9
Lower courts, however, have struggled in applying the congressional-
intent inquiry to statutory interdependence. Despite the considerable
inconsistency in this area, three basic approaches among lower courts have
emerged. Some adopt a purpose-centered approach that asks, "What might
Congress have wanted?" Some focus on the legislative bargain and ask,
"What could Congress have passed?" And others follow something akin to a
textual approach that asks, "What textual evidence did Congress provide
about the topic?" Because the answers to these questions do not always
point in the same direction, the current congressional-intent inquiry produc-
es divergent results.' 0
The confusion surrounding statutory interdependence is particularly
problematic because of the constitutional anxieties that stem from com-
pound severance. Unlike total invalidation, when a court engages in simple
or compound severance, a court is preserving a subset of a law that arguably
did not satisfy Article I's bicameralism and presentment requirement."' Be-
cause some subsets can function quite differently than the original statute,
this practice can be akin to creating a new law.'2 But unlike simple sever-
ance, when a court engages in compound severance, it goes beyond merely
obeying the demands of the Constitution to usurp constitutionally infirm
provisions, 3  and instead nullifies provisions that are themselves
5. See infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 639, 646 (2008) ("Unless the legislature would prefer the statute's total invalidation, the
court severs the unconstitutional provisions or applications, eliminating the offending parts
and establishing a new governing regime.").
7. See infra Part uI.
8. For a discussion on imputing reasonableness to legislative intent, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 750-51 (4th ed. 2007).
9. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
10. See infra Section ll.B.
11. See Gans, supra note 6, at 663 ("The [severability] doctrine gives courts a wide-
ranging power to rewrite statutes, and this regularly enmeshes the judiciary in making policy
choices that are better left to the legislature.").
12. Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495, 1501-02 (2011);
Gans, supra note 6, at 641-43.
13. This is because, with simple severance, all provisions are given effect except for
unconstitutional provisions, which are superseded by the Constitution itself. See Nagle, supra
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constitutional. With compound severance, a different authority empowers a
court to nullify the additional provisions. Vesting in courts this sort of law-
making power to craft what law remains raises serious separation-of-powers
concerns.
14
One justification for courts' power to engage in compound severance is
that doing so is often necessary to fulfill the wishes of the legislature. 5 This
sort of agency argument deserves consideration, but in practice its utility is
undermined by the confusion surrounding the severability test's congres-
sional-intent inquiry.' 6 While some areas of the law benefit from the added
flexibility that attends ambiguous legal tests, this Note contends that statuto-
ry interdependence does not. In this area, a clear statement rule would
encourage legislators to expressly communicate their intent with respect to
the interdependence of statutory provisions. This, in turn, would allow
courts to rely on legislators' express intention when making determinations
of statutory interdependence. 7
This Note argues that courts should only invalidate constitutional provi-
sions of a statute-whether by compound severance or total invalidation-in
two relatively narrow circumstances. The first is when legislators insert a
clear statement declaring statutory interdependence. The second is when no
rational legislator would have wanted to retain the provision without the
unconstitutional provision. This approach would substantially strengthen the
existing presumption favoring simple severance and would result in fewer
instances of compound severance and total invalidation. I call this approach
to severability analysis the "qualified clear statement rule."
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly reviews the test for sev-
erability and statutory interdependence. Part H explains the difficulties in
applying the test and identifies the inconsistent results that have followed
from courts' discordant approaches to statutory interdependence. Part III
contends that a qualified clear statement rule would benefit courts and legis-
lators, alleviate constitutional concerns, and preserve democratic
accountability.
I. THE TEST FOR STATUTORY INTERDEPENDENCE
To determine whether simple severance, compound severance, or total
invalidation is appropriate, courts engage in severability analysis. The Su-
note 1, at 228-29 ("[After severance], the statute still exists as it was enacted, although the
unconstitutional provision will never be given effect. Accordingly, the statute that is given
effect in subsequent cases is the same statute enacted by Congress and presented to the Presi-
dent, except that the unconstitutional provision is never applied."). But with compound
severance, a smaller subset than what simple severance would have retained is given effect.
14. Movsesian, supra note 2, at 57-58.
15. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 284-85 (1989).
16. See infra Section I.B; see also Nagle, supra note 1, at 245 ("[Liegislators display
conflicting understandings of what a severability clause means.").
17. See infra Section IlI.A.
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preme Court set forth its modem severability framework in Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Brock. 8 Alaska Airlines instructs courts to presume that unconstitu-
tional provisions are severable from statutes, so this framework is akin to a
presumption of simple severability.' 9 This presumption can be rebutted by a
finding of statutory interdependence. Statutory interdependence exists be-
tween two or more provisions when their relationship is so significant that
severance of one compels severance of the other.
Alaska Airlines provides lower courts with a two-prong test for statutory
interdependence. 20 The first prong is an inquiry into congressional intent.21
A court must determine whether Congress would have enacted the other
provisions in the statute without the unconstitutional provision.2 2 Because of
the presumption of simple severability, a court should not invalidate other
provisions without some sort of evidence. Sources of evidence could include
an inseverability clause, an inference from the structure of the statute, or
legislative history.23 If statutory interdependence exists between only some
provisions, compound severance will result.24 If statutory interdependence
exists between all provisions, total invalidation will result.25
The second prong is an inquiry into legal operability. Even if a court de-
termines that Congress intended to keep the other provisions without the
unconstitutional provision, a court must still consider whether the remaining
provisions can "fully operat[e] as a law."26 If they cannot, then they too
should be struck, resulting in either compound severance or total invalida-
tion.27 Because Alaska Airlines notes that "[t]he more relevant inquiry in
evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a manner con-
sistent with the intent of Congress, '28 remaining provisions that are struck
on grounds of legal inoperability could also be described as having been
struck because Congress would not have enacted them without the unconsti-
tutional provision. Thus, the Court's explanation conflates the two prongs to
some degree, making the congressional-intent prong the focus. 29
18. 480 U.S. 678 (1987). Occasionally, the Court does not cite Alaska Airlines when
making severability determinations, but in those situations the Court almost always cites cases
that cited Alaska Airlines themselves. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246,
259 (2005) (citing Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684), quoted in Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607-08 (2012) (plurality opinion).
19. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
20. See id. at 684-85. Severability analysis is, in essence, analysis for statutory interde-
pendence.
21. See id. at 684 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam)).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1299-300 (9th
Cir. 1998).
24. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. See id.
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The presumption of simple severability, the two-prong test, and the fact
that complex statutes can include both related and unrelated provisions
combine to create ambiguous cases of statutory interdependence. There are
many examples that aptly illustrate how statutory-interdependence
determinations can be challenging.3" One such case is Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, where the Court ruled § 244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, a provision providing legislative veto
power over deportation actions taken by the Attorney General, unconsti-
tutional.31 The Act contained a severability clause, which indicated that
Congress considered each provision severable from the other provisions
in the event that a court ruled a provision unconstitutional.3 2 Put differ-
ently, the severability clause stated that, should a court excise any
provision in the Act, the other provisions should remain in effect.
On first glance, the statutory-interdependence inquiry seemed straight-
forward: per Congress's severability clause, there were no interdependent
provisions in the Act, so the Court did not need to invalidate any additional
provisions.33 But members of the Court disagreed over whether this was so.
In particular, some justices felt that the provision that empowered the Attor-
ney General to suspend deportation proceedings was interdependent with
the provision providing for a legislative veto over the same proceedings. 34
On the one hand, the provisions could be viewed as interdependent because
Congress probably intended them to work together-this authority was pre-
cisely what the legislative veto was designed to check. 5 On the other, the
presence of the severability clause evidenced that Congress intended the
provisions to be severable. 36 Ultimately, a majority of the Court accepted the
30. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) (plurality opinion); Florida
ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 E3d 1235, 1320-28 (11 th Cir.
2011), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (plurality opinion); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 E3d 757, 772 (2d Cir.
1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
31. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 406, note following 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
33. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932. The Court decided Chadha a few years before Alaska
Airlines, but because Alaska Airlines did not substantially alter severability analysis, it is un-
likely that the Court would have decided the statutory-interdependence question differently.
See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684-86.
34. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1014 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By severing § 244(c)(2), the
Court permits suspension of deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that
suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should expand the statute in this way without
some clear indication that Congress intended such an expansion.").
35. See id.
36. Id. at 932 (majority opinion) ("Here, however, we need not embark on that elusive
inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides: 'If any particular provision of this
Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of
the Act and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby." (citation omitted)). The Court also cited legislative history in support of its
conclusion. See id. at 932-34.
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latter argument and allowed the suspension provision to remain effective,
essentially ruling that the provisions were not interdependent. 37 Multiple
commentators criticized the Court's severability approach as unclear or
poorly reasoned, 38 but most of the disapproval likely stems from the com-
mentators' lack of understanding of what constitutes statutory
interdependence.
II. CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE TEST
Courts that must determine whether two or more statutory provisions are
interdependent face several challenges in applying the Alaska Airlines test.
The ambiguities in severability doctrine began early in the doctrine's histo-
ry, as the Court provided little explanation on the power to sever. This lack
of guidance-particularly on how to determine congressional intent regard-
ing statutory interdependence-has persisted in the Court's modem
jurisprudence. These ambiguities have affected lower courts, which employ
different approaches when analyzing provisions for statutory interdepend-
ence. Section II.A discusses the minimal guidance provided to courts
determining congressional intent. Section II.B studies how federal courts of
appeals have approached the determination of congressional intent when
analyzing statutory provisions for interdependence.
A. Guidance on Congressional Intent
The ability of courts to sever at all developed fortuitously, yet it was al-
most always focused on the goal of honoring congressional intent. Notably,
during the development of severability doctrine, the Court never expressly
stated that a court could sever otherwise constitutional provisions. Based on
the Court's focus on imaginative reconstruction of congressional intent,
which enables courts to act as the legislature would have wanted, however,
we can infer the Court's power to engage in compound severance or total
invalidation.3 9 Still, the lack of guidance on how to make this determination
leaves many statutory-interdependence questions unanswered. Section
II.A. 1 discusses imaginative reconstruction of congressional intent. Section
II.A.2 lists unanswered questions concerning this practice.
1. Imaginative Reconstruction
The Court has always assumed the power of simple severance-that is,
to sever unconstitutional provisions from statutes and leave the remaining
provisions in effect. 40 Chief Justice Marshall engaged in simple severance in
37. Id. at 935.
38. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1, at 205.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43, 51-54.
40. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803) (ruling Section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional but giving effect to the statutory remainder);
1487June 2013]
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Marbury v. Madison but did not discuss the origin or contours of the Court's
severance power.41 When the Court eventually addressed the issue of sever-
ability, it announced a presumption of simple severability but remained
silent on the issue of statutory interdependence. 42 Instead, the Court's early
jurisprudence was influenced by state courts, which occasionally severed
provisions related to unlawful provisions on the grounds that the provisions
that remained postseverance functioned in an absurd manner or not at all.43
The first state court to invalidate an entire statute on the basis of an un-
constitutional provision was the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown." At issue in Warren was an Act making
Charlestown a part of Boston for all meaningful purposes but purporting to
keep Charlestown separate for purposes of electing federal representatives.
45
In so doing, the Act effectively disenfranchised the voters of Charlestown. 46
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Shaw ruled the statutory provisions dis-
counting the Charlestown voters for federal election purposes
unconstitutional. 47 He noted that all the other provisions in the Act outlined
procedures to take subsequent to the unconstitutional annexation-such as
when and where to hold town hall meetings specific to the annexation.48 The
provisions were thus interdependent on the unconstitutional provision.4 9 As
a result, the court struck down the entire statute.50
Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 250
(1994); Stem, supra note 1, at 79.
41. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173; see also Nagle, supra note 1, at 212 ("[Marbury] gave no
indication that the unconstitutionality of one provision--or its application-would render an
entire statute invalid.").
42. Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829) ("If any
part of the act be unconstitutional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full
effect will be given to such as are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States....");
see also Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J.
ON LEGis. 227, 232 (2004).
43. See, e.g., Exch. Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 34 (1853) ("Strike out
this section, and the balance of the statute is perfect as an enactment...."); id. at 48 (Thur-
man, J., concurring) ("May that section be treated as void without affecting the validity of the
remainder of the act? ... The bad may be rejected, and the good left."). In his article Severa-
bility, Professor Nagle notes several of these state court cases. Nagle, supra note 1, at 212
nn.48-49.
44. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854).
45. Warren, 68 Mass. at 86-87 ("It is provided in its first section that all the territory
within the limits of the said city of Charlestown, in the county of Middlesex, with all the in-
habitants and estates therein, shall be annexed to and become a part of the city of Boston in
the county of Suffolk, becoming in all respects as the said city of Boston; excepting that, for
the purpose of electing senators to the general court, said territory shall continue to be and
remain a part of the district of Middlesex; and for the purpose of electing representatives, it
shall remain a distinct representative district."); see also Nagle, supra note 1, at 213.
46. Nagle, supra note 1, at 213; Shumsky, supra note 42, at 233.
47. Warren, 68 Mass. at 105-07.
48. Id. at 100.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 107.
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In addition to being the first court to engage in total invalidation, the
Warren court was also the first to frame the question of statutory interde-
pendence in terms of legislative intent: if the state legislature would not have
enacted the additional provisions but for the unconstitutional annexation
provision, then the additional statutory provisions were interdependent and
should be invalidated. 5' While some inquiries into legislative intent are noto-
riously difficult because of the need to reconcile conflicting positions among
legislators, severability inquiries often involve the additional challenge of
answering a question-"What provisions of the statute should remain?"-
that the legislators may not have considered at all. The method employed by
the Warren court to address such a highly speculative question, which the
legislature may never have even considered, is today called imaginative re-
construction, a technique whereby judges attempt to place themselves in the
shoes of legislators and consider "how [the enacting legislators] would have
wanted the statute applied to the case at bar."52 With respect to severability
of federal laws, the imaginative-reconstruction approach to determining
congressional intent could be described as "evaluating a counterfactual:
What would have happened if Congress had known that the provision ...
was invalid?"53 The Warren case proved influential, and the Supreme Court
eventually adopted its approach.5 4
2. Unanswered Questions
The two-prong Alaska Airlines test echoes the Warren approach in that it
emphasizes congressional intent in making determinations of statutory
interdependence. A court may address the congressional-intent prong by
51. See id. at 84 ("When the parts of a statute are so mutually connected and dependent,
as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legis-
lature would not pass the residue independently, if some parts are unconstitutional and void,
all the provisions, which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them.");
Nagle, supra note I, at 213 ("Warren was the first case to consider legislative intent-along
with the ability of the remaining provisions of the statute to function-in deciding severabil-
ity.").
52. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 817 (1983).
53. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 E3d 1297, 1300 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998).
While this approach has its critics, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW 349-51 (2012), it is relied on by judges across the ideological spectrum, see Caleb Nel-
son, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 348-50, 405 (2005) (discussing the
differences and similarities between intentionalists and textualists).
54. See Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880) ("The point to be determined in all
such cases is whether the unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general scope
of the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what appears to
have been the intent of the legislature.").
55. See supra Part I. Precisely how much emphasis to afford congressional intent has in
the past generated some debate, notably between Justices White and Brennan in Regan v.
lime, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (plurality opinion). Justice White described the analysis of
severability (and by extension, statutory interdependence) as "largely" one of congressional
June 2013] 1489
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looking to the presence of a severability or inseverability clause. When the
statute contains neither, however, the court relies on imaginative reconstruc-
tion. 6 The legal-operability prong can be defined in terms of congressional
intent, and thus also involves imaginative reconstruction.17 Yet, there are
many challenges associated with relying upon imaginative reconstruction as
a technique to determine statutory interdependence. These challenges in-
clude at least three confusing areas of the severability doctrine.
First, it is unclear how strong the presumption of simple severability is
or what rebuts that presumption. 8 Arguably an inseverability clause would
rebut such a presumption, but it remains uncertain how much weight a court
should give to its assessment of a statute's structure or design, let alone
comments found in a statute's legislative history, relative to the text of the
statute. 9 Moreover, because Alaska Airlines adopted a presumption of sev-
erability, and the absence of a severability clause does not affect that
presumption, it is unclear what work, if any, the insertion of a severability
clause in a statute does.6" It is similarly unclear what reverses the presump-
tion of simple severability when the statute contains a severability clause
and if the threshold for reversal is more stringent in this case.6 1 It might be
permissible to dismiss a severability clause if Congress actually intended a
result contrary to the clause's direction, as the dissenters believed in
Chadha. 62 But such an approach would involve overlooking the plain mean-
ing of the text.63
Second, it is unclear whether the congressional-intent and legal-
operability prongs work in tandem or are instead distinct steps of the
analysis. 4 The question here is whether a court should make the final de-
termination about which provisions to sever irrespective of the legislature's
stated or imagined intention.65 For example, compound severance or total
invalidation of a statute might be permissible if a court determined that the
remainder, despite satisfying the congressional-intent prong, was legally
inoperable. The Court has invalidated remainders on these grounds in the
intent, id. at 653, whereas Justice Brennan described the same analysis as "exclusively" one of
congressional intent, id. at 664 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. See supra Section H.A.l. Inseverability clauses communicate whether Congress
considers a statute severable (or provisions interdependent), and thus reduce the degree
of guesswork by a court in determining congressional intent. See Israel E. Friedman,
Comment, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CH. L. REv. 903, 904-06 (1997) (discuss-
ing severability clauses).
57. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
58. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 59-60.
59. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 73-74; Friedman, supra note 56, at 904.
60. See supra Part I; see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 59-60.
61. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 73-74; Friedman, supra note 56, at 904.
62. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
63. Friedman, supra note 56, at 905-06.
64. See supra Part I.
65. See supra note 55 (discussing whether severability analysis is "exclusively" or
"largely" a question of congressional intent).
1490 [Vol. 111: 1481
Statutory Interdependence
past, although these decisions preceded the Court's more recent emphasis on
congressional intent.66
Recent decisions cast doubt on whether a court should ever declare pro-
visions interdependent when Congress unambiguously declares that they are
not, which Congress can do by inserting an inseverability clause. For exam-
ple, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, the Court
described the Alaska Airlines inquiry as "essentially an inquiry into legisla-
tive intent."67 In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
the Court declared that "the touchstone for any decision about [severability]
is legislative intent."68 Moreover, several of the most recent cases involving
determinations of severability refined the Alaska Airlines test, indicating that
a court "must," as opposed to "may," retain a statutory provision if it deter-
mines that Congress would have preferred that course of action.69 This
refinement of the test suggests that evidence of congressional intent, either
demonstrated by a severability clause or divined through imaginative recon-
struction, is all a court needs to conduct its severability analysis. Yet, the
Court still discussed the analysis as a two-prong test.70
Finally, the Court has not provided guidance on how to conduct the im-
aginative-reconstruction analysis in cases where Congress failed to insert
either a severability or inseverability clause.7" Courts can construe the ques-
tion of what Congress "would have done" in different ways, including what
some members of Congress might have wanted done or what Congress
might have been capable of passing. Moreover, the Court has not offered
clear guidance on what types of sources-legislative history, severability
and inseverability clauses, statutory structure and design-are most
66. See, e.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (totally invalidating a statute de-
spite the presence of a severability clause); see also supra note 55 (discussing the role
congressional intent plays in severability analysis).
67. 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999).
68. 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). The Court went on to warn against "substitut[ing] the
judicial for the legislative department of the government." Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (quoting
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161
(2010) ("We therefore must sustain [the statute's] remaining provisions '[u]nless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions ... independently of that which
is [invalid].'" (second and third alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992))). In his dissenting opinion in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, Justice Scalia described the test in a similar fashion: "If Congress 'would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not,' then
courts must strike the provisions as a piece." 531 U.S. 533, 560 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)). Because
the Court still invokes the legal operability step of the Alaska Airlines test, it is doubtful that
the Court-at least in Free Enterprise Fund-intended this wording as a departure from the
Alaska Airlines framework. See Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161-62 (quoting this step of
the Alaska Airlines test).
70. See Free Enter Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161.
71. See id.
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instructive in making this determination, which makes finding an already-
elusive answer even more difficult.
7 2
Recent decisions have focused on the desire to invalidate as few related
provisions as possible.7 3 Thus, it seems that courts should hesitate to find
provisions interdependent absent some type of clear statement from Con-
gress, although this is not evident from the wording of the Alaska Airlines
test itself.74 Despite the fact that courts uniformly apply the Alaska Airlines
test when addressing issues of severability, the Court's lack of guidance as
to the specifics has made application of the test challenging.
B. Application in the Lower Courts
Studying the application of the Alaska Airlines test provides insight on
how courts employ imaginative reconstruction to ascertain congressional
intent regarding statutory interdependence. Courts all seek to determine
whether Congress would have wanted to retain certain provisions, but they
reach divergent conclusions in part because they approach the question dif-
ferently. This Section examines approximately sixty federal court of appeals
decisions 75 from 1987 to 2012 that cited Alaska Airlines and discussed sev-
72. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
("[W]hen a court confronts an unconstitutional statute, its endeavor must be to conserve, not
destroy, the legislature's dominant objective."); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258
(2005) ("Although ... we believe that Congress would have preferred the total invalidation of
the statute to the dissenters' remedial approach, we nevertheless do not believe that the entire
statute must be invalidated. Most of the statute is perfectly valid. And we must 'refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and
not to destroy.").
74. The Court has not invalidated an entire statute in which a severability clause is
present since Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), although arguably a court could do this and
still be within the parameters of the Alaska Airlines test. See supra notes 66-69 and accompa-
nying text.
75. Statutory-interdependence inquiries are often fact specific, and over this wide range
of cases, many different statutes are examined. While it is possible that some of the discrepan-
cies arise because the courts are interpreting different statutes, this difference likely does not
account for most of the variation, as courts reading the same statute and applying the same test
still frequently reach divergent conclusions. The decisions that made severability determina-
tions with respect to the Affordable Care Act are instructive. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2668-77 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (finding all
provisions interdependent); Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1320-28 (11 th Cir. 2011) (finding no provisions interdependent), rev'd
sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (plurality opinion); Goudy-Bachman v.
U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 811 F Supp. 2d 1086, 1109-11 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (find-
ing two provisions interdependent on another provision); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 E Supp. 2d 768, 789-90 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding "directly-dependent" provi-
sions dependent without specifying which provisions), vacated, 656 F3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012).
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erability.76 While the ways in which the courts ascertain congressional intent
differ, some themes emerge and can be summarized as representing three
approaches to imaginative reconstruction of congressional intent.7 7 Section
II.B. 1 describes the purpose approach. Section II.B.2 describes the bargain
approach. Section II.B.3 describes the textual approach. Section II.B.4 com-
pares and contrasts the three approaches.
1. The Purpose Approach
Many courts adopt an analysis defined here as the purpose approach.
This approach focuses on what version of a statutory remainder would best
effectuate what a court understands as Congress's central purpose in passing
the statute.78 Thus, the court would consider provisions interdependent if it
could ascertain that Congress designed them as complementary elements
intended to "operate together or not at all. '79 The court could rely on a
severability clause as evidence, but the existence of the clause would not
necessarily be dispositive. 0 That is, the court could overlook a severability
clause and rule provisions interdependent by drawing an inference from the
76. It is likely that there are at least a few court of appeals severability cases that do not
discuss Alaska Airlines, but there are probably not many since Alaska Airlines is widely con-
sidered the Court's leading contemporary opinion on severability analysis. Moreover, because
none of these cases are routinely cited in other court of appeals opinions for their approaches
to severability, it is unlikely that any of these decisions carry particular import, at least with
respect to statutory interdependence.
77. See supra Section I.A. Professor Nagle's article provides useful background to
different ways of thinking about legislative intent. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 229-32.
78. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 E3d at 1327 ("Just because the invalidation
of the [unconstitutional provision] may render these [other] provisions less desirable, it does
not ineluctably follow that Congress would find the [other provisions] so undesirable without
the [unconstitutional provision] as to prefer not enacting them at all. The fact that one provi-
sion may have an impact on another provision is not enough to warrant the inference that the
provisions are inseverable."); Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 E3d 383, 403 (5th Cir.
2008) ("Severing the [unconstitutional provision] would leave those other considerable re-
quirements intact, and they would continue to effect Congress's purpose."); ACLU v. Reno,
217 F.3d 162, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000) ("As a result, if it is possible for a court to identify a
particular part of a statute that is unconstitutional, and by striking only that language the court
could leave the remainder of the statute intact and within the intent of Congress, courts should
do so."), vacated sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Petersburg Cellular P'ship
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 705 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he invalidation of [this] provi-
sion ... will not frustrate the purpose of these other provisions."); United States v. Spokane
Tribe of Indians, 139 E3d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e must still strike down other
portions of the statute if we find strong evidence that Congress did not mean for them to re-
main in effect without the invalid section.").
79. Reyes v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization (In re Reyes), 910 F2d 611,
613 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated sub non. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has suggested a high bar in reaching this type
of determination, explaining that the removal of mere incentives to effectuate a certain pur-
pose generally does not frustrate Congress's intent. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 186 (1992).
80. Spokane Tribe, 139 F.3d at 1299.
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statute's structure or possibly by consulting legislative history.8 The pur-
pose approach is common. 2 One of many examples is Petersburg Cellular
Partnership v. Board of Supervisors, where the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that a statute contained no interdependent provisions
because the unconstitutional provision was just one element of a "large and
complicated statutory scheme" that did not "interfere in a substantial way"
with the other statutory provisions, and its invalidation did not "frustrate
[Congress's] purpose" in enacting the statute.83
However, the purpose approach has some shortcomings. While some
statutory schemes are relatively straightforward, other statutes are highly
complex, contain many provisions, and achieve several objectives.84
Moreover, several courts have lamented the difficulty in "[fliguring out why
Congress passed a piece of legislation." 85 Legislators can be motivated by
multiple interests, and these motivations might not be easy to identify.86 Fi-
nally, even if a court were successful in deducing these motivations, such
motivations might still not suggest a straightforward answer to the question
of interdependence.8 1
2. The Bargain Approach
Other courts approach imaginative reconstruction of congressional intent
by considering provisions as interdependent when they are essential to the
legislative bargain or enacted as part of a quid pro quo. 88 Under this ap-
proach, provisions are interdependent if a court deems that a legislator-or,
perhaps, enough legislators to make the difference between passage and
81. See id. at 1299-300; Nagle, supra note 1, at 246. Professor Nelson, supra note 53,
at 362, has noted the differing opinions on whether consulting legislative history is appropriate
in this context. Compare Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), with id. at 549
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. For general criticism of this approach, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983).
83. 205 F.3dat705.
84. See Petersburg Cellular, 205 F3d at 706 (noting that statutory text, structure, and
legislative history do not always provide answers to severability questions).
85. Spokane Tribe, 139 F.3d at 1299; see also Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 482
(5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (describing severability process as "wholly speculative, and insup-
portable"). The Spokane Tribe court noted that it might not be best situated to solve the
problems caused by the statute and suggested in the alternative that "Congress could return to
the statute and come up with a new scheme that is both equitable and constitutional." 139 E3d
at 1302.
86. See infra Part IU.
87. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 206 (discussing "unanswerable question[s]"); id. at 248
("There is the difficult matter of determining the 'purpose' of a collective body.").
88. An example of this type of analysis from the Supreme Court might include the
dissenting opinion in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, which considered two provisions
interdependent in part because the two may have been "'conditions, considerations [and]
compensations for each other' that [could not] be severed" from the unconstitutional provi-
sion. See 531 U.S. 533, 560 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Warren v. Mayor of
Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 99 (1854)).
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not-voted for the unconstitutional provision only after successfully bar-
gaining for another provision.8 9 For example, in Eubanks v. Wilkinson, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed a statute restricting access to
abortions.90 After ruling a provision requiring two-parent consent for minors
unconstitutional, the court examined whether an additional provision relat-
ing to the minor's own consent was interdependent on the unconstitutional
provision.91 The majority reasoned that if it retained the minor consent pro-
vision without the unconstitutional provision, the statute would not operate
in the manner intended by Congress.92 But instead of resting its judgment on
that finding, the court remanded the case, instructing the court below to de-
termine whether the minor consent provision was enacted as an element of a
legislative trade.93
The bargain approach also suffers from several shortcomings. Like the
purpose approach, the question of which sources are appropriate to consult
remains; the structure of a statute or legislative history may provide clues
about such a trade, or perhaps even other secondary sources could evince
some sort of bargaining.94 These sources also may not point in the same
89. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012)
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("Often, a minor provision will be the
price paid for support of a major provision. So, if the major provision were unconstitutional,
Congress would not have passed the minor one."); Basardh v. Gates, 545 F.3d 1068, 1070
(D.C. Cir, 2008) (per curiam) ("It has long been the rule that if separate statutory provisions
are so 'dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each
other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could
not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some
parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or con-
nected must fall with them.'" (quoting Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1880))); Eubanks
v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1128 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Generally a court may sever an invalid
provision of a statute, leaving the rest to operate, if the 'invalid portion can be shown not to
have been the inducement for the passage of the act,' and if there is no evidence that 'the valid
and invalid parts of the act' were 'conditions, considerations, or compensations for each oth-
er."' (quoting 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44.06 (4th
ed. 1986))).
90. Eubanks, 937 F2d at 1128-29.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1129.
93. See id. ("The record does not address the question whether the Kentucky legislature
would have enacted this consent provision, specific to minors, whether or not it enacted the
provision requiring two-parent consent. We therefore remand to the District Court for a hear-
ing to determine whether the provision requiring the minor's consent should be left intact or
whether the entire statute should be declared invalid since the portions of the statute which
appear to carry out the statute's dominant purpose have been stricken."). Since the court fo-
cused on three factors-congressional purpose, legal operability, and compensatory
provisions-and reached conclusions on the first two, it can be inferred that the remaining
consideration on remand was the need to determine whether the provisions were inducements
for each other. See id. at 1128-29.
94. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2675-76 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). For example, with respect to the passage of the Affordable
Care Act, at least one senator was criticized in the press for perceived quid pro quo behavior.
See, e.g., 'Cornhusker' out, More Deals in: Health Care Bill Gives Special Treatment, Fox
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direction, especially given that some compromises are intentionally left un-
recorded, making them very difficult to detect. 95 Similarly, different agendas
motivate different legislators.96 The bargain approach may suffer from an
additional limitation in that public choice theory, a framework for examin-
ing how individual preferences aggregate into a collective decision, suggests
that this approach is not an effective way to assess congressional intent.97
Public choice theory posits that each element of a legislative bargain carries
import by virtue of its presence in the bill.98 Put differently, each provision
on its own could be viewed as an essential element of a "carefully-crafted
scheme" that was designed to strike a balance between two or more interest
groups.99 Based on this theory, it would be difficult for a court to discern
which terms were essential absent some type of textual evidence.' °
3. The Textual Approach
Finally, some courts require a clear statement that Congress did not in-
tend for a statutory remainder to continue to operate in order to find
statutory interdependence.' 0' Courts that follow this approach interpret the
presumption of simple severability robustly and require unambiguous evi-
dence, such as an inseverability clause, to rebut the presumption. 02 The
textual approach thus relies less on legislative history to ascertain congres-
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.compolitics/2010/03/18/comhusker-kickback-
gets-boot-health/#ixzz24sKUwly6.
95. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 71 ("[A] 'legislative bargain' involves hundreds ...
who vote for the bill .... The vast majority of these 'parties' remain silent during the bill's
consideration.").
96. Friedman, supra note 56, at 918-20; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1988) (discussing why the contours of the legislative bargain can be
difficult to ascertain).
97. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
30-33 (2009); Friedman, supra note 56, at 918-20.
98. See CRoss, supra note 97, at 30-33; Friedman, supra note 56, at 918-20.
99. United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1998).
100. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 231 ; Friedman, supra note 56, at 918-20.
101. See, e.g., Pittston Co. v. United States, 368 F.3d 385, 401 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Pittston's assertion that the Coal Act is 'incapable of functioning independently' is belied by
the fact that the Coal Act continues to function without [the infirm provision applying to a
certain class of operators]." (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684
(1987))); Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2002)
("The statutory scheme will continue to function if that singular [unconstitutional] clause ...
is struck down."); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1988)
("Since the ordinance can function effectively if so limited, we invalidate it only as to [the
constitutionally infirm provisions]."); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 482 (5th Cir. Unit B
Oct. 1981) (describing legislative-intent inquiry as "wholly speculative, and insupportable").
102. See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(discussing the need to conserve as much of the remaining statute as possible).
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sional intent. 10 3 A statute's structure or design could inform a court's deci-
sion about congressional intent, but probably to a lesser degree than the
purpose or bargain approach. 1°4 Courts often invoke the textual approach in
conjunction with the maxim that a court's duty is to save, and not to destroy,
statutory remainders. Courts also rely on the idea that rulings of statutory
interdependence involve an "editorial freedom... [that] belongs to the Leg-
islature, not the Judiciary."' 15 The dissenting opinion in Eubanks, rejecting
the majority's reliance on the bargain approach to determine congressional
intent, 10 6 followed the textual approach.' 7 Instead of remanding the case, the
dissent would have excised the unconstitutional consent provision and re-
tained the remaining provisions in the statute. 08 The dissent noted that the
remainder of the statute functioned in a coherent manner, and it emphasized
the lack of evidence--essentially, the absence of statutory text-rebutting
the presumption of simple severability. °9
The textual approach, while more predictable than the purpose and bar-
gain approaches, is not without its faults. It might be considered harsh
medicine for a court not to find statutory interdependence and to instead
leave all other provisions in effect based on what could be mere legislative
oversight to include an inseverability clause. While the legislature could
reconvene and remedy the problem, the transaction costs of doing so-
particularly in the case of a clear and incontrovertible error-suggest that
103. See, e.g., Cam 1, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 460 E3d 717, 721
(6th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he zoning and construction provisions operate independently from the
licensing provision. There is no reason why Plaintiffs cannot operate their establishments in
the proper part of town and in the proper type of building without an adult entertainment li-
cense from the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Council."); Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v.
Harford Cnty., 58 E3d 1005, 1012-13 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (describing remaining provi-
sions as categorically unrelated to the unconstitutional provision).
104. See supra Sections II.B.1-2.
105. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162
(2010) (discussing whether to "blue-pencil" related provisions). The Court noted that "Con-
gress of course remains free to pursue any of these options going forward." Id.
106. See supra Section II.B.2.
107. Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1130 (6th Cir. 1991) (DeMascio, J., dissent-
ing) (noting the presence of a severability clause); see also Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109
(2d Cir. 2006) ("We know of no evidence that Congress would not have applied the RFRA to
the federal government unless it could also be applied to state and local governments."); Nat'l
Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasiz-
ing the strong presumption of severability), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 513 U.S. 454 (1995);
Ackerley Commc'ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 522 (1st Cir. 1989)
(ending analysis after noting the presence of a severability clause).
108. Eubanks, 937 F.2d at 1130 (DeMascio, J., dissenting) ("The contention that the
notarization requirement, the mandatory two-parent consent provision, and the 'if available'
language are integral to the meaning of the statute is untenable. The balance of the statute
functions independently of these provisions. Severance of these clauses does not render the
remainder of the statute inoperable."). The dissent argued that its approach also furthered
legislative intent due to the presence of a severability clause in the statute and thus disagreed
with the majority's determination of congressional purpose. See id.
109. See id.
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this approach could be inefficient. Because it requires textual evidence to
find interdependence, the textual approach also provides courts with less
flexibility to respond to situations that the legislature may not have foreseen.
4. The Three Approaches Compared
The three approaches to imaginative reconstruction regarding statutory
interdependence overlap to some degree, but they still have defined bounda-
ries and can lead to different results."10 An example should help illustrate
how the three approaches can intersect and diverge. Consider a controversial
bill introduced in the U.S. Senate. The bill originally consists of two provi-
sions: first, a controversial tax-cut provision, and second, a review provision
providing that senators will meet annually to discuss whether the tax rate
affected by the tax-cut provision should be raised or lowered. Suppose that,
after initial discussions, only fifty senators express support for the two-
provision bill. To guarantee passage, the senators add a third provision that
provides funds for the construction of an art museum in the home state of a
fifty-first senator. Now assume that a court finds the controversial tax-cut
provision unconstitutional, requiring it to address whether the review and
museum-funding provisions are interdependent on the unconstitutional tax-
cut provision.
With respect to distinguishing between the purpose and bargain ap-
proaches, one of two scenarios is possible for the museum-funding
provision once the court severs the tax-cut provision. First, the majority of
legislators might dislike art museums and have agreed to the museum-
funding provision only to ensure passage of the tax cut. Had they known
that the tax-cut provision would be ruled unconstitutional, they would have
wanted the museum-funding provision to be severed as well. In this scenar-
io, the court should find the museum-funding provision interdependent with
the tax-cut provision under both the purpose and bargain approaches. Under
the purpose approach, the provisions would be interdependent because the
senators would have wanted the museum-funding provision to fail; under
the bargain approach, the provision would be interdependent because the
museum-funding provision was enacted as part of a quid pro quo."'
But there is another possible scenario. Fifty legislators could have been
indifferent to the museum-funding provision, or they could have secretly
wanted the museum-funding provision to pass and would have been happy
to pass the provision independently. These legislators might have included
the museum-funding provision in the bill either out of convenience or as
part of a strategic ploy to secure another vote for the tax-cut provision. The
motivation for securing the vote could include an array of opportunistic be-
havior, such as using the vote against a legislator during an election or
obtaining bragging rights that a bill enjoyed bipartisan support. In this sce-
110. See Nelson, supra note 53, at 348-50 (discussing the differences and similarities
between intentionalists and textualists).
111. See supra Sections H.B. 1-2.
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nario, a court would not find the museum-funding provision interdependent
under the purpose approach, but it would find the provision interdependent
under the bargain approach. Under the purpose approach, the museum-
funding provision would remain in effect because a majority of senators
would have wanted the museum-funding provision to remain absent the tax-
cut provision.1 2 Under the bargain approach, the museum-funding provision
would be interdependent and severed because it was part of a quid pro quo
for the (now unconstitutional) tax-cut provision."13
The textual approach overlaps with the purpose and bargain approaches
but remains largely distinct. In this hypothetical, the bill lacks a severability
clause, but it contains the usual presumption of simple severability. The pre-
sumption is not rebutted because the bill does not contain an inseverability
clause. Some courts might check the statute's design for suggestions of legal
inoperability, but here, the tax-cut provision does not affect the legal opera-
bility of the museum-funding provision. Thus, under the textual approach,
there would be no interdependence between the provisions, and the muse-
um-funding provision would remain law. 14
But what of the review provision, which provides that the senators must
meet annually to discuss the extent of the (now unconstitutional) tax-cut
provision? Surely the degree of relation between the review provision and
the tax-cut provision is more significant than was the relationship between
the museum-funding and the tax-cut provisions, but does this greater degree
of relation warrant a finding of interdependence? The answer depends on
which approach a court utilizes. Under the purpose approach, the tax-cut
and review provisions would be interdependent, as they were designed to
work together to further a goal.115 Under the bargain approach, the answer
would turn on whether legislators supported the meetings as a condition or
in consideration of the tax CUt. 116 Under the textual approach, the review
provision would almost certainly not be interdependent and would not be
struck along with the tax-cut provision."7 This is for two reasons: first, the
lack of textual evidence to rebut the presumption of simple severability,118
and second, the legal operability of the review provision on its own.
112. See supra Section ll.B.1.
113. See supra Section ll.B.2.
114. See supra Section ll.B.3. This could depend on whether a court utilized legislative
history and whether there were statements in the legislative history that clearly contradicted
the idea that Congress considered the provisions severable.
115. See supra Section ll.B.1. The seemingly obvious cooperation of the two provisions
makes this an easy case given the structure of the statute; in all likelihood, evidence from
legislative history would support this as well.
116. See supra Section ll.B.2.
117. See supra Section lI.B.3. What constitutes concrete evidence may be open to inter-
pretation. A severability or inseverability clause would certainly qualify. Statutory language
describing the relationship between two provisions as one that is "essential" might also count.
See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 48-49.
118. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 904-07 (discussing the presumption of severabil-
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Congress could certainly enact a law providing for legislators to meet annu-
ally to discuss a nonexistent provision, which would be capable of operation
insofar as the legislators could gather for this purpose. Such a law would not
be inoperable but merely irrational, and thus would fall short of rebutting
the robust simple-severability presumption of the textual approach.
III. DEFINING STATUTORY INTERDEPENDENCE
The Alaska Airlines test focuses on congressional intent for purposes of
determining statutory interdependence." 9 The technique of imaginative re-
construction, whereby courts look for clues and try to divine whether
Congress would have retained a statutory provision, serves to help in cases
where the text is silent or unhelpful. 20 The purpose, bargain, and textual
approaches to statutory interdependence are, respectively, ways of determin-
ing what Congress might have wanted, could have passed, or tried to
demonstrate with respect to interdependence among provisions in a particu-
lar statute.' 2' The Alaska Airlines test, however, provides courts with little
guidance on which approach is best. 122 This is particularly problematic be-
cause the approaches can result in different outcomes. 23 Adopting a clearer
rule is essential to establish proper ex ante incentives for legislators to ex-
press their preferences and to promote judicial decisions that honor those
preferences. Section III.A introduces and encourages adoption of a qualified
clear statement rule. Section III.B discusses how the rule would work in
practice by comparing it to other severability decisions and applying it to a
recent circuit split concerning the severability of the Food and Drug Mod-
ernization Act. Section IH.C addresses potential counterarguments to the
qualified clear statement rule and explains why adoption of the rule is pref-
erable to the status quo.
A. A Qualified Clear Statement Rule
This Section proposes a qualified clear statement rule to resolve the stat-
utory-interdependence ambiguities related to Alaska Airlines. According to
the qualified clear statement rule, a court should only deem provisions inter-
dependent in either one of two circumstances: first, where Congress has
clearly stated that the provisions are interdependent, such as by inserting an
inseverability clause, or second, where the court has objectively determined
that no rational legislator could have wanted to retain a provision in the
absence of a related provision. 24 The rule strengthens the presumption of
119. See supra Part 1.
120. See supra Section II.A.1
121. See supra Section H.B.
122. See supra Section II.A.2.
123. See supra Section Ul.B.
124. An inseverability clause can be complete-invalidating all provisions if any one
provision is found unconstitutional--or partial-invalidating some provisions if a certain
provision is found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1, at 243-44.
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simple severability by requiring that courts neither engage in compound
severance nor totally invalidate a statute absent the presence of clear tex-
tual evidence, such as an inseverability clause, unless doing otherwise
would produce a wholly irrational result. Section III.A.1 discusses the
clear statement requirement, which maps onto the Alaska Airlines con-
gressional-intent prong. Section III.A.2 discusses the narrow qualification
to this requirement, which maps onto the Alaska Airlines legal-operability
prong.
1. Clear Statement Requirement
The first prong of the Alaska Airlines test directs courts to determine
statutory interdependence in a manner consistent with congressional in-
tent. 125 This type of inquiry is highly elusive, and it has led courts to develop
three different methods of using imaginative reconstruction to determine
congressional intent: the purpose approach, the bargain approach, and the
textual approach. 26 This Section encourages adopting the textual approach
to the congressional-intent prong of Alaska Airlines, which is embodied in
the "clear statement" requirement of the qualified clear statement rule.
The qualified clear statement rule is a modified version of the textual
approach and is designed to place the burden of finding provisions inter-
dependent on the legislature while allowing for a small degree of judicial
leeway in cases of clear error or oversight. According to the qualified clear
statement rule, a court should only deem provisions interdependent if
Congress has clearly stated its intention that the provisions are interde-
pendent-such as by inserting an inseverability clause-or if no rational
legislator would wish to retain a provision in the absence of a related
provision.1
27
The clear statement requirement provides courts with a bright-line rule
in an area of the law that would greatly benefit from added predictability.
This is because the Alaska Airlines test, presumptions, and severability
clauses together establish something of a dialogue between the legislature
and courts, in which the legislature conveys its intent in some form and a
court responds by giving effect to that intent, while signaling-in the form
of presumptions-how it will act in ambiguous cases. 28 Without a clear
directive from Congress, courts are faced with the mammoth task of navi-
gating what can amount to hundreds of statutory provisions, even before
determining whether they should consult other sources of evidence, such as
secondary sources or legislative history. 129 Absent a clear understanding of
125. See supra Part I.
126. See supra Section H.B.
127. See supra Section H.B.3 (discussing a similar approach).
128. See Gans, supra note 6, at 669-70.
129. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 249 ("[I]t is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible
support in the legislative history .... (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory
Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 125 (1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the judiciary's role in evaluating interdependence, legislators might agree to
vote for a bill containing a controversial provision in exchange for another
provision under the false impression that a court would consider the provi-
sions interdependent should one provision be severed. 3 ' Even worse, the
legislator might not understand why a court ruled as it did, in which case she
might attribute the court's decision to judicial activism and not legislate dif-
ferently in the future-all while the court believes that it gave effect to the
wishes of Congress.' Confusing or inconsistently applied statutory-
interdependence standards thus do a disservice to both courts and
legislators.
The rule this Note proposes also provides the proper ex ante incentives
to a legislator considering whether to vote for a particular law. If the legisla-
tor insists on a certain addition or modification of a provision as
consideration for a favorable vote, she can be reasonably certain that a court
will not preserve the terms of the bargain without a clear statement of statu-
tory interdependence.132 The legislator thus would need to raise that issue
and insist on an inseverability clause in exchange for supporting the bill.133
Otherwise, legislators who later see the linchpin of their bargain unravel
would have no one to blame but themselves and would presumably have a
more difficult time convincing the electorate otherwise. 134 Because legisla-
tors are best positioned to determine which provisions are truly
interdependent-either because of congressional purpose or the terms of the
legislative bargain-the clear statement rule provides the proper ex ante in-
centives. 35
The problem with leaving the decision to the judiciary as to which legis-
lative goals to prioritize or what permutation of a bill best reflects the
legislative bargain is that this approach does not place enough responsibility
on the legislature, the policymaking body, to make these decisions. It is true
that a strong presumption of simple severability could result in the retention
of an undesired provision, and that, in some cases, a legislator would want a
court to fix an oversight made in the drafting process. But the need for polit-
130. See supra Sections II.B.1-2.
131. See supra Section 3.B; see also Nagle, supra note 1, at 245 ("[L]egislators display
conflicting understandings of what a severability clause means.").
132. Requiring a clear statement rule would decrease the likelihood that a court would
ever construe a statutory remainder as absurd or inconsistent with congressional intent. See
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at 239 (describing absurdity as encompassing only unin-
tended results).
133. For an example of a legislator engaging in this practice, see Nagle, supra note 1, at
241.
134. See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at 239 (noting the narrow scope of
the absurdity exception).
135. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2438-39
(2003) (applying the same logic to the absurdity doctrine). But see Gans, supra note 6, at 644,
675. Some commentators have encouraged the legislature to adopt a clear statement rule with
respect to severability, which would also provide ex ante incentives to this effect. See Nagle,
supra note 1, at 233; Friedman, supra note 56, at 920-21.
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ical accountability, as well as basic separation-of-powers principles, coun-
sels in favor of allowing the undesired remainder to stand.136 Courts should
not insulate the public from the effects of poor or sloppy legislation; doing
so in most cases does no favor for those who elect officials. 137
2. Qualification for Objectively Irrational Results
The second prong of the Alaska Airlines test instructs courts engaging in
severability analysis to find provisions interdependent when doing otherwise
would result in a legally inoperative remainder.138 The Court's most recent
jurisprudence has tended in the direction of telling courts that they "must"
uphold whatever remainder Congress intended, which makes the role of this
prong relative to the congressional-intent prong unclear.139 This Section pro-
poses understanding the legal-operability prong as an instruction to courts to
find provisions interdependent when doing otherwise would result in an ob-
jectively irrational law. This approach is embodied in the "qualification"
element of the qualified clear statement rule.
Legal operability would only seem to apply in two cases. First, a court
might feel compelled to invalidate a statutory provision on grounds of inter-
dependence when Congress wants it to remain, but the remainder operates
poorly. This could include cases in which the remainder results in what a
court believes is a bad law and could be explained by legislators pursuing
unwise policies. 140 Second, a court might feel compelled to invalidate a pro-
vision on legal operability grounds when Congress has made an error-for
example, if Congress accidentally failed to include an inseverability
clause.' 4' In the first of these situations, allowing a statutory remainder to
stand could result in a poorly designed law. In the second, allowing a statu-
tory remainder to stand could result in a law so foolish that no rational
legislator would ever support it.
The qualification element of the qualified clear statement rule would not
avoid poorly designed laws but would guard against unthinkably foolish
laws. Courts in general do not save Congress from pursuing poorly designed
policies, reasoning that such behavior damages notions of political
accountability and separation of powers. 142 However, in some cases, engag-
ing only in simple severance could do more harm than good, even at the
expense of political accountability.143 Some of these cases could involve
136. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 226.
137. See Manning, supra note 135, at 2433, 2437 (arguing that Article I of the Constitu-
tion counsels in favor of requiring legislators to compromise and then protecting that
compromise).
138. See supra Part 1.
139. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 221.
140. See CRoss, supra note 97, at 160-62.
141. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 8, at 727; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at
234-39. But see Nagle, supra note 1, at 238-39.
142. See Movsesian, supra note 2, at 57-58.
143. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at 234-39.
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scriveners' errors, such as a clear typographical error, or an honest congres-
sional oversight. 1" In other cases, changed circumstances could render a
statutory remainder so incoherent or absurd that no rational legislator would
ever support it.145 In these cases, allowing the judiciary to invalidate addi-
tional provisions-whether by compound severance or total invalidation-is
more efficient from a transaction-costs standpoint, and also provides a small
degree of flexibility to courts in extraordinary circumstances.
The main benefit of the qualification is that it provides courts with flexi-
bility in cases where potential consequences are costly, particularly when
the lack of an inseverability clause is a result of a congressional oversight.
Because the qualified clear statement rule permits compound severance and
total invalidation absent textual evidence when no rational legislator would
prefer otherwise, the rule's use would avoid most significant consequences
of retaining poorly designed statutory remainders. As to legislative over-
sights that do not result in objectively irrational results, Congress would
have the option to reconvene, modify the law as it stands, and determine the
appropriate remedy. Although reconvening would be difficult in some cir-
cumstances, it would be increasingly likely that Congress would reconvene
in instances where electoral consequences are great. In other words, the
worse off the electorate is because of the statutory remainder (at least up to
the point of triggering the qualification), the lower the transaction costs are
for Congress to revisit the legislation. 146
Courts would have less flexibility under the qualified clear statement
rule than the status quo, but the benefits of better democratic accountability
and more predictability would offset this cost. In some cases, the statutory
remainder might not reflect the intended purpose or the bargain between
members of the legislature, and yet it would stand. Those members of Con-
gress, either because of their misunderstanding or poor drafting, might be
deeply unsatisfied with the resulting statute. The people who elected them
might feel similarly. But the best long-term arrangement is not for courts to
"blue-pencil" the statute for those representatives,'47 but rather to allow citi-
144. Id. at 234-37.
145. Professor Manning's article, The Absurdity Doctrine, highlights some of the incon-
sistencies that inhere in absurdity jurisprudence. Manning, supra note 135, at 2398 n.32. For
purposes of this Note, a rational legislator would not rule a statutory provision interdependent
because not doing so would contradict commonly held social values. See id. By contrast, a
reasonable legislator would rule a statutory provision interdependent if not doing so would
result in a truly irrational result. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 474
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I should think the potential of [the absurdi-
ty] doctrine to allow judges to substitute their personal predilections for the will of the
Congress is.. . self-evident....").
146. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 227.
147. For more discussion on why courts should not "blue-pencil" to save the legislature,
see Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161-
62 (2010).
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zens to judge the merits of the legislation by choosing whether to reelect
their representatives.148
B. The Rule Applied
Under the qualified clear statement rule, the outcomes of many severa-
bility cases would remain the same. This could be explained by the fact that
a court adopted a similar methodology during its analysis or by mere coin-
cidence. In other cases, however, the qualified clear statement rule would
lead a court to a different result. This Section explores both types of cases.
Under the qualified clear statement rule, the result would be the same as
the one reached in several severability-focused cases, including Immigration
& Naturalization Service v. Chadha49  and Warren v. Mayor of
Charlestown.150 At issue in Chadha was an Act with provisions providing
the Attorney General with authority over deportation proceedings and
providing for a legislative veto to check that power. 5' A court applying the
qualified clear statement rule in Chadha would note that the Act's severabil-
ity clause serves as textual evidence of congressional intent, rendering
additional imaginative-reconstruction analysis-either on purpose- or bar-
gain-focused grounds-unnecessary. 5 2 Put differently, the severability
clause would trump the fact that several legislators likely believed that the
two provisions should work together. 53 The narrow exception for wholly
irrational results-which would permit a court to find statutory interdepend-
ence absent, or in spite of, a clear statement of congressional intent-would
not save the Attorney General provision. This is because a hypothetical
rational legislator could conceivably believe that the Attorney General's
authority over deportation proceedings would be worthwhile even absent the
legislative veto provision. 154
Adopting this rule would also generate the same result in Warren, but for
different reasons. At issue in Warren was an Act involving the annexation of
the City of Charlestown in an effort to disenfranchise the city's voters-an
annexation that the Massachusetts court ruled unconstitutional. 55 The court
found that the other provisions, which related to events that would occur
subsequent to annexation, such as the time and place for town meetings,
were interdependent on the unconstitutional provision. 156 The Act contained
148. See Friedman, supra note 56, at 922-23 (observing that allowing "harsh results" to
stand can have worthwhile effects).
149. 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
150. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854); see also supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
151. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923; see also supra text accompanying note 31.
152. See supra text accompanying note 36.
153. See supra text accompanying note 35.
154. See supra Section I.A.2.
155. Warren, 68 Mass. at 86-87, 105-07; see also supra notes 45-47 and accompanying
text.
156. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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no clear statement of legislative intent regarding interdependence and so, at
first blush, the presumption of simple severability would control. 157 But this
case would fall into the irrational-results exception, and so a court under the
qualified clear statement rule would still find the provisions interdependent.
Because no rational legislator would establish a law requiring a town meet-
ing for a town that did not exist, a court would reach the same result-a
finding of statutory interdependence and hence invalidation-under this
rule.
158
By contrast, there are some cases in which application of the qualified
clear statement rule would result in a different outcome. One example in-
volves a recent split among the federal courts of appeals. In Western States
Medical Center v. Shalala, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the provisions of the Food & Drug Administration Modernization
Act ("FDAMA") for interdependence."l 9 Under the Act, pharmacists that
comply with several specific requirements qualify for an exception from an
otherwise complex and time-consuming new drug approval process. 60
When the Ninth Circuit ruled one of the requirements unconstitutional, it
had occasion to determine whether the exception itself was dependent on the
unconstitutional requirement, which would require striking down the entire
Act.16 1 Despite the presence of a severability clause in the statute, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the entire Act. 62 The court reasoned that the Act was
"designed to strike a balance between competing interests," and that it "be-
lieve[d] that Congress would not have passed [the Act] absent the
[unconstitutional provision]"163-statements that echo both the purpose ap-
proach and the bargain approach to statutory interdependence.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, facing the same question of
whether to invalidate the entire Act, approached the statutory-
157. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
158. For another example, see National Advertising Co. v. Town of Niagara, 942 F.2d
145, 151 (2d Cir. 1991), where the court explained, "Were we convinced that the remaining
structure was capable of being administered in a. . . coherent.., manner, we would do so. We
are not so convinced.... [W]e conclude that severance of the invalid sections would create a
statute that is confusing and unworkable." Unlike the act at issue in Warren, the statute in
Town of Niagara-a sign ordinance--contained a severability clause. See id. at 147. The anal-
ysis is the same regardless of whether the statute contains a severability clause. See supra
Section IH.A.
159. 238 F.3d 1090, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). The Supreme Court did not address the court's statutory-
interdependence analysis. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
160. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub L. No. 105-115, § 503A,
Ill Stat. 2328, 2328 (1997).
161. See Shalala, 238 F.3d at 1096-98.
162. Id. at 1097-98. More precisely, Congress enacted the FDAMA as an amendment to
a law that included a severability clause itself. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F3d
383, 402 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e can only assume that Congress was fully aware .. and that
Congress intended the severability provision to apply... " (quoting Koog v. United States, 79
E3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1996))).
163. Shalala, 238 E3d at 1096-97.
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interdependence analysis differently, in a manner resembling the textual
approach. 64 The court described the severability clause, a clear statement of
congressional intent, as "crucial" to the interdependence inquiry. 65 The
court also observed that the Act imposed six requirements besides the un-
constitutional requirement on pharmacists seeking the exception,' 66 and it
reasoned that several members of Congress might have been satisfied with
an exception containing only these remaining requirements. 167 In other
words, in addition to the persuasive effect of the clear statement on severa-
bility, it was entirely conceivable that a rational legislator would believe that
providing an exception to pharmacists was still worthwhile, even without
one of the original seven requirements. The court engaged in simple sever-
ance to invalidate only the unconstitutional provision. 68
The Fifth Circuit's result is the same as that which would be obtained by
applying the qualified clear statement rule. A court examining the Act under
the qualified clear statement rule would note the absence of any clear state-
ment in the statute to rebut the presumption of simple severability. Thus,
consistent with honoring congressional intent under the Alaska Airlines test,
it would excise only the unconstitutional provision. It would also find that
the exception to the complex drug approval process, even with one fewer
requirement, was not objectively irrational, and thus was legally operable
under Alaska Airlines. Reliance on the qualified clear statement rule would
have given legislators considering the FDAMA an incentive to insist on the
inclusion of an inseverability clause in exchange for their vote if they felt
strongly that the exception contained all the requirements. By contrast, if
most legislators would have voted in favor of the exception even absent
some of the requirements, then the law could have been passed without an
inseverability clause. Either way, the responsibility to make the difficult
policy decision-"Is an exception to the new drug approval process with
fewer requirements consistent with the wishes of Congress?"-would fall
where it should: on the legislature. 6
9
C. Addressing Counterarguments
This Section addresses potential counterarguments to adopting the quali-
fied clear statement rule. The first is that a court could adopt a presumption
of inseverability rather than a presumption of simple severability, thus elim-
inating the need to speculate about interdependence. 70 By adopting this
presumption, the court would simply invalidate an entire statute on the basis
164. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 401-05.
165. Id. at 401.
166. Id. at 402-03.
167. Id. at 403.
168. Id. at 405.
169. See supra Section Mll.A. 1.
170. See, e.g., Gans, supra note 6, at 688, 697 (arguing for a presumption of inseverabil-
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of an unconstitutional provision. 7' This suggestion is unwise.' 72 It is true
that a rule of inseverability might be slightly more straightforward than a
qualified clear statement rule, and in cases where a court cannot determine
legislative intent, ease of judicial administration may be the best metric for
adopting a rule. 173 Adopting this presumption of inseverability, however,
runs counter to the vast majority of the Court's jurisprudence on severabil-
ity, which emphasizes congressional intent.'74 Additionally, because
legislators often include severability clauses in statutes,17 1 it is more likely
that Congress generally wishes for courts "to save and not to destroy" the
remainder of their statutes. 176 Thus, a presumption of inseverability would
run counter to the well-accepted notion that, when interpreting statutes, the
court acts as an agent of the legislature and aims to fulfill the legislature's
wishes.
177
Another potential counterargument is that rather than apply a qualified
clear statement rule, courts should retain or excise whichever remaining
provisions result in the best policy instead of allowing a poorly functioning
remainder to stay in effect. 78 This is a similarly unwise and potentially dan-
gerous approach, since reasonable people can disagree as to which policy is
best. This method would thus not have the same advantages of predictability
as the qualified clear statement rule. It would also not resolve the separation-
of-powers concerns posed by issues relating to statutory interdependence. 79
Moreover, it would insulate inept legislators from political accountability. 81
Critics of the qualified clear statement rule could also argue that a pur-
pose- or bargain-focused approach to imaginative reconstruction would
better determine congressional intent than would a qualified clear statement
rule, which is largely premised on the textual approach.' 8' The argument
goes that examining legislative history or statutory design can be quite ef-
fective as a means of learning a statute's purpose or deciphering a statute's
171. See id. at 697.
172. Several commentators share this view. See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 2, at 79-80
(advocating for a presumption of severability); Nagle, supra note 1, at 227-29 (countering
arguments in favor of a general rule of inseverability); id. at 250 (arguing for a general pre-
sumption of severability).
173. See Posner, supra note 52, at 820.
174. See supra Part I.
175. Under such a rule, it is likely that a severability clause would truly become a boiler-
plate term.
176. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) ('The cardinal
principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy."); Nagle, supra note 1, at 251;
Friedman, supra note 56, at 910-11.
177. See Farber, supra note 15, at 283-84.
178. See CROSS, supra note 97, at 102-05.
179. See id. at 112-19.
180. See supra Section HI.A. .
181. See supra Section IM].A.
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underlying legislative bargain. 82 But these arguments are ultimately unper-
suasive. Assuming for the sake of argument that a single legislative purpose
or bargain exists, 83 efficiency considerations counsel against adopting a
purpose- or bargain-focused rule. Even if a statute reflects a single congres-
sional purpose or legislative bargain, it can be difficult and time-consuming
for a court to ascertain what this purpose or bargain is, particularly with re-
spect to complex statutes. Courts would also occasionally make good faith
errors. When a single congressional purpose or legislative bargain does ex-
ist, legislators will always be better positioned than courts to identify what
that purpose or bargain is-they, after all, sat through hearings and partici-
pated in negotiations."8 A rule that provides an incentive for the legislature
to state its purpose or reveal the terms of its bargain ex ante will save courts
time and reduce the opportunity for error. 85
A textual-focused approach like the qualified clear statement rule is al-
so preferable to a purpose- or bargain-focused approach because a rule
that cabins a court's tendency to "blue-pencil" provisions best comports
with constitutional principles of bicameralism and presentment. 86 The
judicially constructed statutory remainder that results from simple or
compound severance places a version of a law into effect that did not pass
both houses of Congress. 87 One justification for allowing statutory re-
mainders to have legal effect is that these constitutional concerns are
abated if one considers the severed statute the same as that which was en-
acted, with the unconstitutional provisions still existing in a metaphysical
sense but simply never given effect.' 88 Put differently, a provision is never
truly severed from an act; it is merely trumped by the Constitution and
rendered legally meaningless. 8 9
182. See, e.g., John E Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
438 (2005) ("[Pierhaps the most important premise of classical intentionalism ... [is] the idea
that behind most legislation lies some sort of policy judgment that is meaningfully identifia-
ble, shared by a legislative majority, and yet imprecisely expressed in the public meaning of
the text that has made its way through Congress's many filters.").
183. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 53, at 349-51 (describing the use of legislative
history as "philosophically indefensible as violating the separation of powers").
184. This is a variant on a cheapest cost-avoider argument. See generally Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
185. See supra Section HIIA.
186. See supra Section I.B.3.
187. See Campbell, supra note 12, at 1501-03; Nagle, supra note 1, at 228; Shumsky,
supra note 42, at 247-48. This would only apply to statutes without a severability clause given
that the presence of the clause is a manifestation of assent to all possible combinations of the
statute.
188. Nagle, supra note 1, at 228-29 ("Rather, the statute still exists as it was enacted,
although the unconstitutional provision will never be given effect. Accordingly, the statute that
is given effect in subsequent cases is the same statute enacted by Congress and presented to
the President, except that the unconstitutional provision is never applied.").
189. See id.
1 509June 2013]
Michigan Law Review
This justification might quell constitutional concerns relating to simple
severance, but it does not explain why compound severance-when a court
severs an unconstitutional provision along with some constitutional provi-
sions-or total invalidation is constitutionally permissible. When otherwise
constitutional provisions are severed from an act, no provision of the Consti-
tution supplants their place in the law. Moreover, unlike total invalidation,
compound severance allows a statutory remainder to have legal effect de-
spite the fact that this subset would not seem to meet Article I's
bicameralism and presentment requirement. Adopting the qualified clear
statement rule limits instances of compound severance because it robustly
strengthens the presumption of simple severability and thus greatly limits
outcomes besides simple severance. 190 The rule permits other outcomes, but
only in cases where it appears that Congress has made a mistake-that is,
when no rational legislator would prefer an alternative course of action. 191
Thus, the qualified clear statement rule greatly limits situations in which
compound severance allows a subset of a law to remain in effect.
A final counterargument against the qualified clear statement rule is that
courts will invoke the qualification exception to the rule too often and thus
read more flexibility into the rule than is appropriate. This potential for
abuse is certainly possible, 192 but even if judicial activism limited the bene-
fits of the qualified clear statement rule, it would still occasion an
improvement from the status quo. Moreover, it is worth noting that any
court inclined to stretch the rule would do so whenever convenient, irrespec-
tive of which rule is adopted. 193 So long as at least a few courts follow the
qualified clear statement rule in good faith, adopting it will result in better
communication between courts and legislators and thus more consistent
severability decisions among courts.194
CONCLUSION
The current test for statutory interdependence is vaguely defined and re-
sults in courts applying inconsistent approaches to determine congressional
intent. The qualified clear statement rule would strengthen the presumption
of simple severability and in almost all cases require a clear statement to
rebut the presumption. Statutory interdependence would not exist without a
clear congressional statement unless the remaining provisions would func-
tion so incoherently that no rational legislator would want them to have
effect. Adopting a qualified clear statement rule instead of the other
imaginative-reconstruction approaches would provide legislators with an ex
190. See supra Section lI.A.
191. See supra Section IlI.A.1.
192. See, e.g., Coss, supra note 97, at 160-61; Farber, supra note 15, at 285-86 ("[O]ne
does not have to be a legal realist to know that ... [a] judicial interpretation often arises out of
the court's view of public policy as much as any attempt to fathom the statutory text.").
193. See, e.g., CRoss, supra note 97, at 91-101.
194. See Farber, supra note 15, at 287.
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ante incentive to communicate their preference to courts and increase the
likelihood that courts would correctly honor that intent. This rule also best
aligns with core constitutional principles and would provide a consistent
framework for courts addressing questions of statutory interdependence in
severability analysis.
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